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Today, more things than people are connected to the Internet, more mobile than fixed broadband subscriptions are active and more 
than 50% of the world’s population lives  in cities. Smartphones and the mobile services  and apps that run on them have become 
the predominant interface between citizens and the 
so-called ‘Smart City’. This however, poses difficul-
ties  for cities and local governments  that are faced 
with a  plethora of new challenges in a changing 
public service context. This  paper provides  nine 
inhibiting and contributing factors  that form initial 
steps  in re-thinking what cities  in general, and 
Brussels  specifically, should focus on in their efforts 
to becoming ‘smarter’, with mobile as  a  key start-
ing point. 
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1. The year 2008  signified a  turning point in the field of smart cities 
and mobile research for three reasons. For the first time, (1) there were 
more mobile than fixed broadband subscriptions, (2) more 'things' than 
people were connected to the Internet, and (3) more than half of the 
world’s population lived in cities  [Burger, 2012; Evans, 2011; UNFPA, 
2007]. In this  context, cities  and local governments  are exploring the 
role which new ICT (information and communication technology) serv-
ices and products can play in increasing the quality of life of their citi-
zens, a quest often captured in the 'smart city' concept [see for exam-
ple Hall, 2000; Joroff, 2008; Campkin & Ross, 2013].
2. These three shifts also point to the fact that smartphones  are – for 
now – turning out to be the predominant 'interface objects' which me-
diate a growing range of urban tasks  and provide primary access  to 
smart city services [Townsend, 2013; Greenfield, 2013]. Mobile apps 
are the connection between physical location and the virtual information 
which can be linked to it and, as  such, are a core part of moving to-
wards 'smarter cities'. The experiments  governments  have undertaken 
in the field of mobile government (or m-government) have been the 
subject of a relatively recent stream of literature [see e.g. Kushchu & 
Kuscu, 2003; Palka et al., 2013; Abu Thair & Abu-Shanab, 2014] which 
focuses  on the challenges  governments  face in this regard. The main 
questions  dealt with in this  article is how this idea  applies to the 
Brussels-Capital Region, and which factors  either inhibit or contribute 
to the development of a  successful mobile strategy in order to go be-
yond the cautious  steps which are currently being taken [see e.g. BRIC, 
2014] and move towards a 'smarter' Brussels. 
1. Framework and methodology
3. In order to answer these questions, the smart city concept and its 
current interpretations  are examined, followed by an introduction of the 
theoretical framework and methodology applied.
1.1. Smart cities and value networks 
4. The interest in the smart city concept on behalf of the public, 
technology firms, academics and the media has  increased in recent 
years, taking an almost science fiction-like line somewhere between 
concerns about control, freedom and privacy [see e.g. Hollands, 2008; 
Joroff, 2008; Greenfield, 2013; Townsend, 2013] and enthusiasm about 
increased efficiency, sustainability and a better world with a higher qual-
ity of life for everyone [see e.g. Caragliu et al., 2009; Lindsay, 2011; 
IBM, 2009]. Establishing an all-encompassing final definition of the 
smart city is  difficult, as  projects, opinions  and initiatives in the field are 
diverse.
5. Research shows  two juxtaposed approaches to the smart city. 
The first approach adheres  to top-down dynamics, often closely related 
to the technologically deterministic idea of a 'control room' for the city, 
striving towards  measurement and optimisation [IBM, 2009]. Certain 
kinds  of top-down vision have been heavily criticised, with the main 
arguments being that they are dictated by corporate interest, entail 
questions  of control and privacy and may not necessarily be sustain-
able from an environmental viewpoint [Greenfield & Shepard, 2007; 
Greenfield, 2013]. 
6. These techno-deterministic or top-down viewpoints are contrasted 
by a  more experimental, bottom-up understanding of what a smart city 
could be, with change coming only from the people 'using' the city 
[Lindsay, 2011]. However, to rely solely on bottom-up processes  would 
also be unlikely or even unfeasible, as citizens are not removed from 
their wider urban context [Hamdi, 2004; Berg, 2012]. 
7. Since 'change seldom arises from purely top-down or bottom-up 
systems  and processes' [Shepard & Simeti, 2013], a  more nuanced 
interpretation is proposed, combining top-down and bottom-up ap-
proaches and establishing the smart city as  a platform which fosters 
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the collective (local)  intelligence of all affected stakeholders [Campkin & 
Ross, 2013]. This means looking at the smart city as a  local innovation 
platform, i.e. a  meeting place where the public sector, private interest 
and citizens  can come together to generate new value and collaborate 
and innovate together. Given that smartphones have been accepted as 
an important interface to begin tackling smart city challenges (for now) 
[Townsend, 2013; Greenfield, 2013], the role of the city as a platform is 
of particular relevance. All stakeholders  need to be involved in order to 
create useful and successful applications in a complex urban context. 
8. In this  sense, the city is seen as  a  stakeholder, playing a value-
adding role in a mobile service business model (i.e. a  complex value 
network). Value networks  consist of stakeholders, roles and relation-
ships  which need to find a  strategic fit [Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998] to 
deliver value (i.e. innovative mobile apps) to end users  [Jullien 2004; 
Chesbrough 2006]. This  operationalisation of the value network and the 
inclusion of public institutions  proposed in Walravens  & Ballon [2013] is 
used to guide the data gathering and analysis as both a theoretical and 
methodological framework (see also Table 3).
1.2. Data gathering
9. In the spring of 2013  and 2014, 22 semi-structured expert inter-
views were conducted with representatives  from several cities, gov-
ernment administrations, developers  and other interest groups active in 
the mobile application ecosystem (Table 1). 
10. Semi-structured interviews allow flexibility, as topic lists  do not 
need to be followed religiously and can be modified depending on the 
expertise or the issues  raised during the conversation [Rathbun, 2008: 
p. 698]. Of course, the data collection is dependent on the will of the 
interviewee, and the circumstances  in which the interview takes  place 
can have an influence (such as  location, time limitations, etc.) [Rathbun, 
2008]. After several attempts, MIVB-STIB  was the only Brussels party 
with a mobile app which did not agree to participate in the interview 
rounds. To complement this  material, policy documents such as  the 
Brussels  Region ICT plan and the Brussels  Region Informatics Centre 
(BRIC) 2014 white paper were analysed. The material serves  as input 
regarding the current state of the mobile services  policy in the Brussels 
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Name Organisation Function/Dept. Date
Bart Rosseau Stad Gent Cel E-Strategy 14/03/2013
Noël Vanherrewghe CORVE, Vlaamse Overheid Coordinator 07/03/2013
Vincent de Roover Stad Antwerpen MarCom Open Data 21/03/2013
Daniel O’Neil Smart Chicago Collaborative CXO 13/08/2013
John Tolva Office of the Mayor of Chicago CTO of the city 13/08/2013
Philippe Allard GIAL – Cellule Web Project manager 29/04/2013
Eric Auqière CIBG/CIRB Service Head 06/05/2013
Thierry Schreiber Brussels Mobility External consultant 29/04/2014
Olivier Van de Kerckhove Visit Brussels Online Media Manager 19/05/2014
Hélène Morel Regional Cabinet ICT Attaché 29/04/2014
Florence Didion Brussels Environment Communications Dept. Head 27/05/2014
Tom Andries Stad Mechelen Webmaster-Coordinator 06/03/2013
Tanguy Delestré Agoria App Alliance Business Dev Manager 04/09/2013
Nicolas Kint Carambla Co-founder 20/02/2013
Wim Vermeulen Momads (dev App van 't Stad) Co-founder 20/02/2013
Jason Sweeney StereoPublic.net Founder 30/05/2013
Nic Wise Big Ted Ltd Founder 20/03/2014
Hannes Van De Vreken iRail/Ghendetta Co-founder 06/02/2013
Bram Allegaert Jeugd en Stad (JES) BEAM Dev Team 24/04/2014
Stijn Vander Plaetse Tag Tag City Product & Marketing 05/05/2014
Bart Gysens Anaxis Former CEO 26/05/2014






















Table 1. Overview of semi-structured interviews.
Region and in the country, and is referred to throughout this article, us-
ing quotes  or otherwise. The business  model framework and matrix 
introduced above were used during the interviews to compose the 
topic lists and to structure their analysis. 
11. Next to the literature study, policy document analysis  and expert 
interviews, statistical data on all the available Brussels mobile apps 
were gathered (a  snapshot of the situation in October 2013  of both 
commercial and publicly created apps). The two main data  sources 
were the App Store and Google Play Store, as iOS and Android repre-
sented 98% of the mobile OS market share in Belgium at the time 
[HowWeBrowse, 2013]. Each source was scraped for results  related to 
Brussels, using the name of city in four languages  (English, French, 
Dutch and German). After removing irrelevant apps  from the database, 
a list of 185 apps  related to Brussels  in the App Store and 136 apps  on 
Google Play remained. The theoretical framework and parameters  of 
the business model matrix (Table 3) were used to identify relevant and 
indicative parameters  in the (relatively) large dataset and to evaluate the 
weight or importance of certain characteristics of the apps. This  statis-
tical data, combined with the document analysis  and expert interviews, 
will give us  both a  general and detailed overview of the related app 
landscape in the City and Region of Brussels. From this  data gathering 
and the detailed analysis  of international urban mobile apps  in Walra-
vens & Ballon [2013], our aim is  to come to a  set of inhibiting and con-
tributing factors  in a successful mobile app strategy. We shall first look 
briefly at the current ICT and mobile policies in the City and Region. 
2. The City and Region of Brussels
2.1. Context
12. The Region, the City and the municipalities  all have competences 
related to ICT: for example, the City and the municipalities  are respon-
sible for their own websites and any online services  they wish to offer to 
citizens  (e.g. social media communications), but municipalities  can opt 
to use some of the Region’s  ICT-services as well (e.g. Irisbox). Open 
data are also approached in an uncoordinated manner, with GIS data 
managed and opened by the Brussels Region Informatics  Centre 
(BRIC), while more typical datasets  (e.g. ATM locations, public toilets, 
etc.) are the responsibility of the municipalities, and in the case of the 
City of Brussels, are opened up by GIAL (Centre de Gestion Informa-
tique des  Administrations Locales), a non-profit organisation which pro-
vides ICT-services to local administrations. This  division of compe-
tences  and service offers can make the development of common poli-
cies a challenge. 
13. Although Brussels  is  known for many of its  positive and negative 
facets and scores quite well in terms of its  competitiveness, it is gener-
ally not perceived as  a smart city and usually scores  very low – or is  not 
present at all – in various smart city rankings  and indices [e.g. Cohen, 
2012; Ericsson, 2013; GSMA, 2013; IBM, 2009]. Although a Regional 
ICT policy plan is  in place for the 2010-2014 period, it lacks  an inte-
grated vision related to mobile services and, in some cases, in the exe-
cution of its promises. 
14. While there are certain issues and questions  to be raised (for ex-
ample on ICT-expenditure [Hillenius, 2013] or the continued balancing 
act between Über and the taxi companies), the Region also takes posi-
tive initiatives in the area of mobile services, launching initiatives  such 
as FixMyStreet Brussels. These will be analysed in an attempt to derive 
a set of inhibiting and contributing factors. In what follows, we will 
briefly zoom in on what is  currently available in Brussels-related mobile 
apps. 
2.2. The Brussels app landscape
15. Based on the scraped data from the app stores, this  section takes 
a look at the current status  of the Brussels  app landscape. iOS is the 
biggest platform, with 58%  of the Brussels  apps available for iOS and 
42% for Android. In the case of Brussels, 31 applications  out of a  total 
of 321 were available both for iOS and Android, representing just under 
10%. The Region and City of Brussels  seem to prefer offering apps for 
both platforms, effectively covering 98% of all mobile OSs in Belgium.
16. 62% of Brussels-related iOS apps are available for free. 10% of 
applications are priced at €0.89, which is  the lowest possible price set-
ting in the App Store. 7% are available at €1.79, 9%  at €2.69, 7%  at 
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€4.49 and only two applications were priced at the highest price point 
for all Brussels  apps: €5,49. There is  no particular theme connecting 
the highest priced applications, other than the fact that they seem to 
offer more detailed information or specific features  (e.g. audio guides  or 
a city game). Given that there has  been a  longer tradition of free apps 
from Google Play, only 15%  of the available Brussels apps were avail-
able for a fee.
17. The success rate of the Brussels  applications  from the App Store 
and Google Play is  difficult to measure: Apple does not indicate the 
number of downloads for each app, and for Google Play, the only 
measure of success  or use is an indication of downloads in quite broad 
ranges (e.g. 5,000-10,000 or 100,000-500,000). Although a proxy, it is 
interesting to note that the mobile app for STIB, the Brussels public 
transport company, is  only one of three Brussels-related apps which 
has  been downloaded at least 100,000 times. 'Travel' and 'Transporta-
tion' are by far the most popular categories (62%  combined). There are 
no official statistics pertaining to the size of the Brussels  or Belgian app 
economy, but the best effort comes from ICT-interest group Agoria, 
which estimates that 1,000 developers  are currently active in Belgium, 
a growth of 27% compared to 2013 [Konings, 2014]. Statistics  pertain-
ing to the origin of the developers  creating Brussels  apps are also not 
available, but a sample test of the database reveals  that a  significant 
portion are not from Brussels  or Belgium and a lot of available apps are 
of questionable quality. It is  important to note that Brussels-based mo-
bile software developers are supported via the software.brussels  clus-
ter, including companies like Tapptic, Appsolution, Movify and others.
2.3. Official Brussels apps
18. The number of official apps by the City of Brussels, the Region or 
any of its institutions is  limited. Table 2 provides  an overview of the offi-
cial apps  for Brussels. All of these apps are available for free, with no 
in-app purchases required or possible.
19. The be.brussels  app applies  to the Brussels-Capital Region and 
offers  a map with points  of interest and useful phone numbers, as  well 
as direct access  to the Region’s  social media streams. Brussels Gar-
dens was created by Brussels  Environment, one of the Region’s  ad-
ministrations responsible for the study, monitoring and management of 
air, water, soil, waste, nature (green spaces  and biodiversity) and so on. 
The app provides an overview of the green spaces  and their uses in the 
Region as  well as information on the history of the green spaces, their 
special characteristics  (classified site, nature reserve, archaeological 
site, etc.), and the conservation of the plants and wildlife found there. 
The same administration also developed a  recipe application which 
highlights  seasonal fruit and vegetables, with some degree of success 
(Didion, 2014). The City of Brussels  app only pertains  to municipal 
Brussels  and was developed by GIAL (see above). It provides  news, 
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Be.brussels BRIC iOS/ Android 2012-12 Utilities FR, NL, EN 2 (1) 3,8 (29) 100-500
Brussels Gardens Tapptic iOS/ Android 2014-03 Lifestyle FR, NL, EN 4 (3) 3,9 (18) 1.000-5.000
City of Brussels GIAL Android 2015-02 Travel & Local FR, NL, EN NA 3,3 (7) 1.000-5.000
Fix My Street Bruxelles BRIC iOS/ Android 2015-01 Social FR, NL, EN 1,5 (9) 3,5 (44) 1.000-5.000
Recettes 4Saisons Brussels Environment iOS/ Android 2014-02 Lifestyle FR, NL 4,5 (26) 4,3 (89) 10.000-50.000
STIB Mobile STIB iOS/ Android 2013-03 Travel FR, NL, EN 2,5 (229) 4 (3391) 100.000-500.000
Visit Brussels Visit Brussels iOS/ Android 2012-12 Travel FR, NL, EN 3,5 (14) 2,2 (132) 10.000-50.000
Table 2. Overview of pub-
licly developed Brussels 
apps.
links  to public transport information, contact information for the city’s 
administrations, links  to the city’s social media streams  and a map with 
points of interest. Already mentioned above, FixMyStreet Brussels  is the 
local implementation of the well-known issue reporting service, first de-
veloped in the UK (Auquière, 2013). It allows  citizens  to report issues 
with city furniture or in the public space, but is  limited to potholes, bad 
road surface or missing road markings in the case of the Brussels  Re-
gion, although its  functionality is gradually being expanded. STIB mo-
bile is  the official app of the Brussels public transport company and 
allows  users to consult real-time departures and timetables  at STIB 
stops. The final official app is  Visit Brussels  by the tourism department 
of the Region, bringing together all kinds  of touristic information and 
offering a city guide. 
20. For each case, including those in Walravens  & Ballon [2013], all of 
the parameters  of the expanded business model matrix described in 
Table 3  were discussed in detail, and each analysis  provided more input 
for the development of the set of inhibiting and contributing factors in-
troduced in the following section. 
3. Inhibiting and contributing factors
21. This  section will present the inhibiting and contributing factors  re-
lated to the successful creation, distribution and/or adoption of mobile 
services  in an urban context. These factors  are derived from the con-
clusions  of the cases briefly described above and are guided by the 
parameters  of the extended business model matrix in Walravens  [2012] 
(see also table 3). No stark distinction between inhibiting and contribut-
ing factors  is  made: these sections describe how certain factors  under 
different circumstances  can play to the advantage or disadvantage of a 
successful mobile vision for a city or local government organisation. 
3.1. Functionality – user [demand] research
22. The role of the user in the mobile services ecosystem is  changing, 
among other things  under the influence of social media [Dörk & Mol-
teyne, 2011]. Apart from having more and more immediate communi-
cations resources, end users  are increasingly approached earlier on in 
the design process of new services, using innovative methods, e.g. in a 
Living Lab setting or open innovation context [Schuurman et al., 2012]. 
This  is  of particular relevance in mobile service development. Although 
an argument is  sometimes  made for soft launches  of digital services  (or 
'minimum viable product'), the end users’ patience with mobile apps  is 
very short: app developers  basically have only one chance to engage 
users, since apps are very easily downloaded and then forgotten if they 
add no real value. 'You try an app once and if it doesn’t work, you are 
dead. […] It is  the first time this  is  so hard in marketing. You only get 
one chance to make a first impression and with apps this  is  more true 
than ever' (Vermeulen, 2013). Next to the actual use of the app, its  use-
fulness should also be evaluated in the ideation and development proc-
ess. This  approach is  in line with the view of the city as a local innova-
tion platform, and universities  and the local research community can 
certainly play a role and provide assistance where needed, to ensure 
that investments are not made in vain. 
3.2. Internal change agents
23. A second important factor in the potential success  of mobile city 
services  is  the role of internal change agents. This term comes  from 
change management and organisational literature and usually refers  to 
the role of managers  in the restructuring of organisations  [Pathak, 
2010; Hartley et al., 1997]. In our operationalisation of this factor, we 
refer to a shift in culture or mindset when it comes  to digital or mobile 
initiatives, and carrying out or promoting this message. This  is  of par-
ticular importance in public service settings where the goals  are more 
comprehensive (holistic), qualitative and more political than in others, 
and the role of internal change agents  can been seen slightly differently 
than in commercial operations  [Hartley et al., 1997]. Apart from a vision 
of mobile services  at the city management or political level, there is  a 
large potential for the right enthusiastic people in the right places. 'This 
whole movement [of open data] has  been characterized as  being very 
bottom-up, but the truth is if you don’t have a chief executive [in the 
city] who supports  this, it probably won’t work' (Tolva, 2013). The in-
volvement of internal change agents  can thus be a powerful contribut-
ing factor which is not always easy to generate or foster.
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Value network Financial model
The combination of assets:  anything tangible or intangible that could be used to 
help an organisation achieve its goals.
The level of vertical integration: the level of ownership and control over succes-
sive stages of the value chain.
Customer ownership:  looks  into the party maintaining the customer relationship 
and keeping the customer data. Related is the level of openness/lock-in of the 
case.
Good governance:  refers to a striving towards consensus and harmonization of 
interests (and related rhetoric), which is deemed essential in good governance.
Stakeholder management:  refers to the choices made with respect to which 
stakeholders (be they public, semi-public, non-governmental, private etc.) are 
involved or invited to participate in the process of bringing a service to end-users. 
Investment structure:  deals  with the necessary investments (both capex and 
opex) and the parties making them.
Revenue model: deals with the trade-off between direct/indirect revenue models 
as  well as the trade-off between content-based and transport-based revenue 
models.
Revenue sharing model: refers  to agreements on whether and how to share 
revenue among the actors involved in the value network.
ROPI: refers to the question whether the expected value generated by a public 
investment is purely financial, public, direct,  indirect or combinations of these, 
and how a choice is justified.
Public partnership model: explores how the financial relationships between the 
private and public participants in the value network are constructed.
Functional architecture Value proposition
Modularity/integration: refers to the design of systems and artefacts as  sets of 
discreet modules that connect to each other via predetermined interfaces.
Distribution  of intelligence: refers  to the particular distribution of computing 
power,  control and functionality across the system in order to deliver a specific 
application or service.
Interoperability: refers  to the ability of systems to directly exchange information 
and services with other systems.
Technology governance:  highlights  the importance of transparency,  participation 
and emancipation in making technological choices  and relates  to the digital di-
vide.
Public data ownership: concerns the terms under which data are opened up and 
to which actors.
Positioning: refers to marketing issues including branding, identifying market 
segments, establishing consumer trust, and identifying competing products or 
services.
User involvement: refers to the degree to which users can contribute to the 
value network.
Intended value: lists the basic attributes that the product or service possesses, 
or is intended to possess, which, together, constitute the intended customer 
value.
Public value creation: refers to the reasons  a government provides in taking the 
initiative to deliver a specific service, rather than leaving its  deployment to the 
market. 
Public value evaluation: decides whether an evaluation of the generated public 
value takes place and if it occurs ex-ante or ex-post. 
Table 3. Expanded business model matrix, including public parameters. Source: Walravens & Ballon, 2013.
3.3. Organisation and political vision
24. The organisational structure of a  local government and the differ-
ent governing levels  it is  composed of can both be a contributing or 
inhibiting element. As illustrated above, the various levels  of governing 
in the Brussels  area, with the Region, the city and the 19 municipalities 
and their partly overlapping competences and many levels  of decision-
making, make it very difficult to successfully initiate holistic projects re-
lated to digital or mobile services. This distributed organisation struc-
ture (or rather combination of different structures)  can however also 
have some benefits: it allows  the Regional departments for example to 
take their own initiatives, without potentially lengthier processes to get 
something approved (e.g. Brussels  Gardens). In any case, coordination 
and communication are critical elements, and the case of FixMyStreet 
Brussels  demonstrates that such an effort is indeed possible, but not 
easy to set up. 'The difficulties  are rarely technical. The biggest chal-
lenge is  the change management that is behind it' (Auquière, 2013). 
This  should be complemented by a political vision which is followed up 
in its execution, to avoid splintered initiatives  (see local innovation plat-
form approach). Formulating and supporting a clear vision is  a  crucial 
aspect to a successful smart city strategy. It also leads  to the question 
as to whether a  city should even be creating its  own applications, or at 
least in which cases. 'The question is  not whether a city should go mo-
bile. The question is: what can a city do for its  citizens  that it can do 
better on mobile than on any other screen? And then it should do that.' 
(Vermeulen, 2013). 
3.4. Path dependence 
25. The (technological) choices that have been made by the local or-
ganisation in the past determine the path it is on and how easily a  mo-
bile perspective can be added. This might occur with respect to infra-
structure for example, when choices  have been made for technologies 
which do not lend themselves easily to a mobile interface, or when an 
existing content management system (CMS) needs  to be adapted to 
be accessed from mobile devices. 'We decided to link our CMS  not 
only to the websites, but also our mobile apps, so there is  only one, 
central entry point' (Andries, 2013). Additionally, an important potential 
inhibitor is  the inefficiency and cost of switching to a  different technol-
ogy [Liebowitz & Margolis, 2000]. A local government might have a  
vision for mobile services  to tackle parts  of urban challenges, but be 
restricted to pragmatic solutions  by decisions  which were made in the 
past and are highly inefficient to overcome. 
3.5. Opening up 
26. This  article has, in several instances, pointed out the potential im-
portance of open data and of providing support to developers  who cre-
ate apps  and services  for the city. It is  becoming more commonplace 
and accepted that open data will be core to the digital strategy of cities 
in the coming years, with 'open by default' becoming the motto.
27. 'For the most part we have pushed app creation to the edges  of 
government. That is  both a resource statement as  well as  an acknowl-
edgment that volunteers and the private sector will probably innovate 
more quickly and certainly on a scale that government cannot match. 
So we really don't create many of our own apps. We put our effort into 
getting the raw materials  for the creation of applications  […] We provide 
the infrastructure in order for innovation and development to happen.' 
(Tolva, 2013). The way in which datasets  are opened up and develop-
ers are encouraged and supported in the process  appears to be a de-
termining factor in the success  of open data initiatives [Summers, 2010; 
Colpaert, 2013]. The licences which are created to regulate the use of 
the data also need attention, since disparate licences may prohibit the 
combination of certain data sets, e.g. those provided by different 
authorities or levels  of government. The open data approach in the City 
and Region of Brussels  would benefit from more coordination and vi-
sion, beyond what is  currently proposed [see e.g. BRIC, 2014]. Open-
ing data can thus  be a very powerful contributing factor to a flourishing 
app economy in a city, but it needs  to be very well handled, promoted 
and supported to generate actual return. 
3.6. Cooperation model
28. The way in which the cooperation between the different stake-
holders  in a  mobile service initiative is  set up, formalised and executed 
can also play an inhibiting or contributing role. Public-private partner-
ships  are a typical example of such a cooperation model. In light of the 
changing role of the user, the term PPPP has  also been introduced to 
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refer to public-private-people partnerships, giving a more prominent 
role of the user. In cases  where such cooperation with citizens is  for-
malised and their input is  an integral part of the ideation, creation, 
launch and promotion of a  mobile city service initiative, the chances of 
success  can be higher. The cooperation model could thus  be seen as  a 
contributing factor. Local governments should be especially careful and 
critical in public procurement processes  and in deciding which compa-
nies to develop relations  with and under what terms, in an effort to 
safeguard the balance between corporate interest and public value. 
3.7. Promotion
29. It should be clear that an essential part of achieving the adoption 
of a  new mobile service is promotion and communication with respect 
to citizens. The adage of 'build it and they will come' has  already been 
disproven on many occasions, and the clear communication of what a 
particular service can contribute to citizens is  crucial in this  case. At the 
core, there should be an urban challenge which could be tackled (in 
part) with a qualitative mobile service, rather than a marketing trick 
which displays a city’s  'smartness' (barring perhaps  apps  with a city 
marketing purpose). When an urban app which cities  would like to see 
adopted has a particular public value, it is a challenge to stand out in 
the current flood of apps. 'I stopped development because there were 
just so many apps. When I released it there were maybe five other 
apps. After about three months  there were more than 50. It wasn't a 
field that was  making money anymore. […] I don't think you can make a 
living off it anymore, the market is  too saturated. I think that’s  true for 
apps in general.' (Wise, 2014). 
3.8. Return
30. An ever returning question cities  raise – particularly in times of 
economic downturn and when efficiency is sought – is  what the return 
on investment is  for them, either financial or otherwise. Likewise, the 
benefit of opening up data  is also often questioned, and research is 
only beginning to explore its potential value. Most recently, Transport for 
London performed an evaluation of their open data project, following 
the same protocols  they use for evaluating transport projects, and 
found that around 500 apps were developed using their real-time open 
data, 5000 people were indirectly employed as a consequence and the 
project saw a return of 58:1. This  meant that for each British Pound the 
organisation put in, it saw a  return of £58  (a minimal expected return is 
1.4:1) [Stott, 2014]. Perhaps most importantly, as  a consequence 
Transport for London stopped developing its own apps. 
31. Developing metrics and evaluation protocols  is key in this regard. 
There are several goals  for which quantifiable KPIs can be decided 
upon, which are described before an app or service is  launched and 
can be measured afterwards. In other cases  and, for example, in light 
of experimentation and serving hard-to-quantify goals, no immediate 
return can or needs to be defined. The most important information 
about whether the return on public investment is  viewed as  a  contribut-
ing or inhibiting factor may be obtained by discussing it during the idea-
tion phase of a mobile service initiative and to consider effects other 
than direct financial return as relevant in some cases as well (e.g. in-
creased public service). 'The biggest return we expect from mobile is 
time gains for the citizens, time gains  for the organization and its civil 
servants, as well as a better, closer way of communicating with our 
target audiences.' (Andries, 2013).  
3.9. Context 
32. As a final and perhaps summarising point, the importance of un-
predictable and contextual factors is highlighted. Contextual factors 
such as timing, unexpected competition, being featured by app stores, 
receiving positive media  coverage and so on, can all inhibit or contrib-
ute to the successful adoption of a mobile app or service. Some of 
these factors  can be mediated or taken into account, but others will 
remain elusive. In the latter case, it is  important for the organisational 
structure or the person in charge of the initiative to be flexible and able 
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Conclusion
33. This  article set out to gauge which factors  contribute to or inhibit a 
successful mobile application strategy for urban areas, exploring the 
context of Brussels in particular. Based on the premise that advanced 
mobile services and applications  constitute an important part of a 
future-proof city, we started by highlighting the potential and divergent 
approaches to what a smart city could be and calling for a  focus on the 
city as a local innovation platform which plays  a connecting role be-
tween relevant stakeholders. Following a statistical analysis of Brussels 
apps  in the iTunes  and Google Play marketplaces, the research pro-
vides an initial look into the types, popularity and number of Brussels 
apps  available. Expert interviews then complemented this data  to help 
better understand certain relationships  and sensitivities. Based on this 
input and the analysis  of the official Brussels  applications, a set of fac-
tors  which may inhibit or contribute to a successful mobile strategy for 
local governments is proposed. 
34. The main limitations of this  article lie in the data gathering and 
analysis  stage of the research. Scraping the iTunes  App Store and 
Google Play only provides  limited insight into some aspects  of the apps 
found there (e.g. exact number of downloads, actual use, language, 
appreciation, etc.). Another limitation is  linked to the basis of the original 
business model matrix which mainly explores  relationships between 
actors  in value networks and does not examine internal organisational 
matters  in detail. In that sense, this  framework and approach would be 
less  suited to evaluating internal organisational processes. The work 
presents a decidedly strategic perspective and aims to explain the po-
tential roles between the city and the network of stakeholders sur-
rounding it. A final limitation lies in the case work: given the state of flux 
of the sector, some mobile initiatives  quickly scale while others  disap-
pear just as fast. 
35. What the cases  do show is  that it is  difficult to fine-tune the role of 
the city as a local innovation platform. FixMyStreet is  the only case in 
Brussels  which comes  close, and shows  a mid- to long-term strategy 
at its  core. It is  then also a showcase of how a smart city challenge can 
(begin to) be tackled through a qualitative mobile application which is 
well thought out and enables citizen participation. In response to the 
question in the introduction, our conclusion is that Brussels is taking 
careful steps  when it comes to mobile apps, and that this caution can 
for the most part be explained by the institutional complexity of the Re-
gion and the (current) lack of a single mobile strategy as  a conse-
quence. Nevertheless, Brussels  may learn from the increasing maturity 
in the mobile (government) apps  sector and leverage its potential in 
order to leap-frog in this  area. In order to do so and to label itself as 
'smarter' than before, a  well-defined contact person or institution 
should put forward an integrated and open-minded approach to mobile 
apps, involving all relevant stakeholders  in the city in the establishment 
of a local innovation platform. 
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